Supreme Court Rules on Statements against Interest, The by Martin, Michael M.
Fordham Law School
FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Faculty Scholarship
1994
Supreme Court Rules on Statements against
Interest, The
Michael M. Martin
Fordham University School of Law, dean_michael_m_martin@law.fordham.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Evidence Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael M. Martin, Supreme Court Rules on Statements against Interest, The , 11 Touro L. Rev. 179 (1994-1995)
Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/faculty_scholarship/76
THE SUPREME COURT RULES ON
STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST-*
Michael M. Martin**
INTRODUCTION
Reliability has been defined as "worthy of dependence" or "of
proven consistency in producing satisfactory results." I It is a
common concept as well as a quality for which individuals search
in their everyday transactions, such as purchasing a car or
selecting an express delivery service. It similarly shapes the rules
of evidence pertaining to hearsay. Beth common law and modem
evidentiary codes ban the admission of extrajudicial statements
offered to prove the truth of a matter asserted because they are
not made under oath, in the presence of the trier of fact, and
subject to cross-examination. 2 Without these safeguards, the trier
of fact cannot evaluate the witness' perception, memory, or
narration, and therefore not the statement's reliability.
Furthermore, the use of hearsay denies those against whom the
statement is offered the opportunity to both challenge the
information itself and confront its declarant. 3
There are, however, instances in which evidence that otherwise
would qualify as hearsay possesses sufficient indicia of reliability
* Reprinted with the permission of The National Law Journal.
Copyright, 1994, The New York Law Publishing Company and the author.
** Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., J.D., University
of Iowa; M.Litt., Oxford University. The author gratefully acknowledges the
assistance of Jennifer Meyer, Fordham Law School class of 1995, in preparing
this article.
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1917 (3d ed. 1986).
2. FED. R. EVID. art. VIII advisory committee's note.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 893-94 (7th Cir.
1986) (excluding hearsay because "the use of second-hand testimony deprives
the trier-of-fact of an opportunity to observe the declarant's demeanor and to
judge his credibility and denies the opposing party its right to cross examine
the declarant"); In re Hoffman, 138 A.D.2d 785, 786, 525 N.Y.S.2d 423, 424
(3d Dep't 1988) (allowing hearsay testimony into evidence would be
tantamount to denying opposing party full opportunity for cross examination).
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to merit admission. 4 Some kinds of hearsay provide the trier of
fact with a more accurate source of facts than a witness' first
hand remembrance of information, and therefore, an exception is
made to the rule excluding hearsay. 5 In other cases, exceptions
are made because the hearsay has circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness that, although not equivalent to in-court
testimony, at least provide sufficient reliability so that admission
is preferable to the loss of relevant evidence. 6 The hearsay
exception for declarations against interest falls into the latter
category. 7
I. STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST
The reliability of declarations against interest stems from the
requirement that the statements are so contrary to the declarant's
interest that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would
not have uttered them unless the person believed them to be
true. 8 Although the assumption that people do not make self-
4. See Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2434 (1994).
5. Some of the exceptions to the hearsay rule that may provide evidence
more accurate than a witness' memory of the event include: FED. R. EVID.
803(5) (recorded recollection); FED. R. EvID. 803(6) (business records); FED.
R. EVID. 803(14)-(15) (documents and statements affecting an interest in
property); FED. R. EVID. 803(12) (marriage and birth certificates).
6. E.g., FED. R. EvID. 803(2) (excited utterances) and FED R. EvID.
804(b)(2) (dying declarations).
7. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3).
8. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3). Rule 804(b)(3) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness: A statement which is at the time of its making
so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so
far tended to subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render
invalid a claim by him against another, that a reasonable man in his
position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be
true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability
and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless
corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.
Id. See, e.g., United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257, 1264 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 262 (1991) ("[T]he circumstantial guaranty of reliability for
[Vol 11
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damaging remarks unless they are true provides the
circumstantial guarantee of reliability for these utterances, it is
also the focus of debate. Not only might individuals have ulterior
motives for making statements contrary to their interests, but
they also might combine incriminating information and neutral or
self-serving facts in the same declaration.
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed this latter
issue in the criminal context in Williamson v. United States.9
Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor held that Federal Rule
of Evidence 804(b)(3) applies solely to statements that are
disserving. 10 While the Court generated four opinions,11 in
unanimously reversing the case, Justice O'Connor's opinion is
consistent with the weight of judicial authority and the rule's
emphasis on reliability.
The common law traditionally confined the admission of
statements against interest to utterances damaging to pecuniary or
proprietary interests. 12 Case law gradually eroded this limitation
and recognized exposure to criminal liability as an interest
worthy of the exception. As Justice Holmes opined in his oft-
quoted dissent in Donnelly v. United States, 13 "[N]o other
statement is so much against interest as a confession of murder, it
declarations against interest is the assumption that persons do not make
statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good reason
that they are true." (citing FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's
note)).
9. 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
10. Id. at 2435.
11. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion. Id. at 2431. There were
concurring opinions by Justices Scalia, id. at 2438, Ginsburg (joined by
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter), id. at 2438, and Kennedy (joined by
the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas), id. at 2440.
12. FED. R. EvrD. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note. See 4
WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 804(b)(3)[04] (discussing thirty-five states that have
adopted the declaration against penal interest exception into their evidence
codes).
13. 228 U.S. 243 (1913).
19941
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is far more calculated to convince than dying declarations, which
would be let in to hang a man .... ",14
Despite this relaxation, courts still rejected statements against
interest by third parties which implicated a criminal defendant.
The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees
criminal defendants the opportunity to confront and cross-
examine witnesses against them 15 in order to promote fairness,
reliability, and the pursuit of truth in criminal trials. 16 These
goals are threatened when prosecutors seek to admit a third
party's confession against an accused without the benefit of cross-
examination. Such evidence is hearsay, subject to the general
dangers of inaccuracy, as well as the specific concerns regarding
the speaker's motivation. 17 Consequently, courts rejected such
testimony as "inevitably suspect" and overly prejudicial. 18
14. Id. at 278 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing Mattox v. United States, 146
U.S. 140 (1892)).
15. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be
confronted with witnesses against him . . . ." See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 403 (1965) (declaring the Sixth Amendment's right of an accused to
confront witnesses against him "'a fundamental right ... made obligatory on
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment'" (citing Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S.
1, 6 (1963))).
16. Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 540 (1986). On a symbolic level
the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses contributes to
the establishment of a system of criminal justice in which the perception
as well as the reality of fairness prevails .... The Confrontation
Clause advances these goals by ensuring convictions will not be based
on the charges of unseen and unknown-and hence unchallengeable-
individuals.
Id.
17. Id. at 541. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141-42 (1968)
("Whereas the defendant's own confession possesses greater reliability and
evidentiary value than ordinary hearsay, the codefendant's confession
implicating the defendant is intrinsically much less reliable.") (White, J.,
dissenting).
18. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 136 (recognizing that a codefendant's testimony is
unreliable by demonstrating that when an accomplice takes the stand, the jury
is instructed to weigh the testimony carefully because of the accomplice's
motivation to shift the blame to defendant).
[Vol 11
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In Dutton v. Evans, 19 however, the United States Supreme
Court held that an extrajudicial statement made by a declarant,
who could have been produced but was not, and which was
inculpating to the defendant was admissible. 20 The Court
reasoned that because the declarant's statement was"spontaneous" and "against his penal interest," it possessed "the
indicia of reliability... widely viewed as determinative of
whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is
no confrontation of the defendant."21
II. DISSERVING, SELF-SERVING STATEMENTS
A third-party declaration inculpating a criminal defendant is an
example of a general problem in applying the exception. To what
extent should the exception permit admission of statements that
combine disserving with self-serving or neutral aspects? Despite
academic debate over this issue, and some cautionary language in
the opinions, the New York courts have consistently rejected the
use of collateral22 statements in criminal cases, as have most
federal courts of appeals faced with the question. Reviewing the
decisional law on this issue provides context and support for the
United States Supreme Court's ruling in Williamson.
The text of Federal Rule 804(b)(3) does not specifically address
statements against interest which also contain remarks that are
either favorable or neutral to the declarant's interest.23 This lack
of guidance is problematic, as the mere fact that a person makes
a broad self-inculpatory confession does not guarantee that all
aspects of the confession are credible. In fact, "[o]ne of the most
effective ways to lie is to mix falsehood with truth, especially
truth that seems partially persuasive because of its self-
19. 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
20. Id. at 89.
21. Id.
22. I.e., "self serving or neutral."
23. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also Williamson v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431, 2441 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a
general overview on this issue, see JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGRET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN ON EVIDENCE I 804(b)(3). at 150-51 (1993).
1994]
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inculpatory nature. " 24 This possibility is acute in the context of
third-party confessions offered against a criminal defendant
because declarants may have ulterior motives for confessing. For
instance, "if during custodial interrogation the declarant
perceived an opportunity to curry favor with the government by
implicating both himself and a third party, he may choose this
course in the hope of gaining immunity or a reduced sentence." 25
Thus, collateral statements lack the indicia of reliability necessary
to merit admission.
Recognizing this credibility problem, New York courts
consistently reject collateral statements under the state hearsay
exception for declarations against interest. In 1970 New York
recognized the admissibility of statements against penal
interest.26 In 1978, faced with third-party statements inculpating
a criminal defendant, the Court of Appeals stated in People v.
Maerling27 that because "a statement may in part be disserving
and in part self-serving, ideally courts should only admit that
portion of an inculpatory statement which is opposed to a
declarant's interest." 28 While the court conceded the need for
individualized determination when such editing would
prejudicially destroy the context of the statement, 29 it stressed the
importance of scrutinizing inculpatory declarations against
interest in light of due process considerations. 30 The "highly
disserving nature" of declarations against interest justified their
admission. The court held that because "neutral and self-serving
statements do not bear the same guarantee of reliability as do the
24. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2435.
25. See United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 774 (2d Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); see also United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d
254, 261 (2d Cir. 1980).
26. See People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d
825 (1970).
27. 46 N.Y.2d 289, 385 N.E.2d 1245, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1978).
28. Id. at 298, 385 N.E.2d at 1250, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
29. Id. at 298-99, 385 N.E.2d at 1250, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
30. Id. at 298, 385 N.E.2d at 1250, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
184 [Vol 11
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disserving ones contained in the same declaration," the collateral
statements were inadmissible. 3 1
The New York Court of Appeals has consistently applied this
rule. For instance, in People v. Thonzas,32 the court affirmed the
use of portions of a codefendant's plea bargain to prove an
element of the crime for which the defendant was accused.
According to the court, because the plea allocution pertained
solely to establishing the criminal element at issue, 33 it complied
with the rule that "within practical limitations, only the portion
of the statement opposed to the declarant's interest should be
admitted." 34
Similarly, in People v. Geoghegan,35 the court rejected
testimony by a detective who recounted a coconspirator's
confession. 36 The reason the court rejected this testimony was
because the coconspirator had a motive to falsify, which made his
confession unreliable in inculpating the defendant. 37 The court
discerned a motive to falsify from the circumstances surrounding
the coconspirator's confession: he acknowledged his role in the
crimes only after discovering that the police already knew of his
participation, then confessed only to less culpable offenses while
implicating the defendant in the serious crimes. 38 Since the
declarant had "powerful incentives" to minimize his role and to
blame others, his statements potentially were self-serving and,
thus, were inadmissible. 39
31. Id. at 299, 385 N.E.2d at 1250, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 322.
32. 68 N.Y.2d 194, 500 N.E.2d 293, 507 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1986).
33. Id. at 196-201, 500 N.E.2d at 294-97, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 974-77.
34. Id. at 198, 500 N.E.2d at 295, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
35. 51 N.Y.2d 45, 409 N.E.2d 975, 431 N.Y.S.2d 502 (1980).
36. Id. at 49, 409 N.E.2d at 976, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
37. Id. at 50, 409 N.E.2d at 976, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 504. The court found
that the codefendant had powerful incentives to minimize his own role in the
crime and to put the blame on the others. Therefore, as a matter of law, his
testimony should not be admissible to prove the guilt of another. Id. at 50, 409
N.E.2d at 977-76, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
38. Id. at 49, 409 N.E.2d at 976, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
39. Id. at 50, 409 N.E.2d at 976-77, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 504-05.
1994]
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Finally, the court rejected the custodial confession of an
accomplice in a murder trial in People v. Brensic.40 In reviewing
the standards for admitting inculpatory declarations against penal
interest, the court stated that once a judge determines that
evidence satisfies the four criteria for admissibility, 4 1 "it should
admit only the portion of that statement which is opposed to the
declarant's interest since the guarantee of reliability contained in
declarations against penal interest exists only to the extent the
statement is disserving to the declarant." 42 Since the confession
at issue did not rule out the possibility that declarant had a motive
to falsify, its reliability was suspect and the statements were
inadmissible. 43
Like the New York Court of Appeals, most federal courts of
appeals have ruled that collateral statements are inadmissible
under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest.
The Seventh Circuit was the first to rule on this issue in United
States v. Seyfried.44 Faced with determining whether the
statement by the defendant's convicted coconspirator that "[n]o
other person had knowledge of or participated with me in
the ... robbery," 4 5 the court denied that the confession had to
be admitted in its entirety in determining whether it was against
penal interest. 46 Instead, the court held that "[w]here a statement
is clearly separable, part of which is against one's interest and
part is not, only that part which is against one's interest and,
40. 70 N.Y.2d 9, 509 N.E.2d 1226, 517 N.Y.S.2d 120 (1987).
41. The four criteria that must be established in order for a statement
against interest to be admissible are: (1) The declarant is unavailable; (2) the
declarant's awareness at the time that the statement was made was against the
declarant's interest; (3) the declarant's knowledge of underlying facts; and (4)
corroborating circumstances independent of the statement. See, e.g., People v.
Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 298-99, 385 N.E.2d 1245, 1250-51, 413 N.Y.S.2d
316, 321-22.
42. Brensic, 70 N.Y.2d at 16, 509 N.E.2d at 1229, 517 N.Y.S.2d at 123.
43. Id.
44. 435 F.2d 696 (7th Cir. 1971).
45. Id. at 697.
46. Id. at 698.
186 [Vol 11
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therefore, has some inherent trustworthiness should be
admitted. "47
The Second Circuit addressed this issue in the context of an
appeal from a conviction for violating federal narcotics laws in
United States v. Marquez.4 8 The court upheld the trial court's
rejection of a codefendant's statement that "the other guys had
nothing to do" with the drug crimes since it did not subject the
declarant to further criminal liability and, thus, lacked "the
inherent reliability which justifies the declaration against [penal]
interest exception to the hearsay rule. "49
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. Lille,, 50
rejected hearsay testimony in reversing a defendant's conviction
for "obstructing correspondence and of uttering and publishing a
forged treasury check." 5 1 The court held that testimony by a
federal agent regarding the defendant's husband's role in his
wife's crimes fell beyond the parameters of Rule 804(b)(3).
Although the court found the husband's statements somewhat
self-incriminating, it deemed them a clear attempt "to ... foist
blame ... onto his wife, thus exculpating himself, or at least
minimizing his criminal liability."52 The Tenth Circuit quoted
extensively from this opinion to justify severing inculpatory
testimony from exculpatory statements in United States v.
Porter.53
This case law represents a consistent trend of excluding from
the scope of Rule 804(b)(3) remarks collateral to a declarant's
statements against penal interest in criminal prosecutions.
Although the text of Rule 804(b)(3) does not explicitly command
47. Id.
48. 462 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1972).
49. Id. at 895.
50. 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978).
51. Id. at 182.
52. Id. at 187.
53. 881 F.2d 878, 882-83 (10th Cir. 1989). Defendant's sister was allowed
to testify to his involvement in certain bank robberies. However, the sister was
unable to testify about his statements that indicated that the defendant's brother
was innocent. Id. at 881-82.
1994]
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this result, 54  the policies underlying evidentiary and
constitutional law mandate it. The Rules' preference for reliable
testimony and the Sixth Amendment's concern for fair criminal
trials support the proposition that only statements which
sufficiently endanger the declarant's penal interest are
trustworthy enough to merit the attention of the trier of fact.
Similar reasoning pervades the Supreme Court's opinion in
Williamson v. United States.55
III. WILLIAMSON V. UNITED STATES
Williamson arose out of an interstate drug conspiracy. 5 6 A
Georgia deputy sheriff stopped a rental car driven by Harris for
weaving on the highway. 57 As a result of a consensual search of
the car, the sheriff found nineteen kilograms of cocaine in the
trunk and arrested Harris. 58 Shortly following the arrest, Harris
told a DEA agent that he obtained the cocaine from an
unidentified Cuban in Florida, that the drugs belonged to
Williamson, and that he was to deliver the drugs that night to a
particular dumpster. 59
The DEA agent attempted to arrange a controlled delivery of
the drugs, but Harris stopped him by confessing that he lied
about the Cuban and his plans for the drugs because he was
afraid of Williamson. 60 He explained that he was transporting the
drugs to Atlanta for Williamson, who had been traveling in front
of him in another rental car. He claimed that Williamson had
seen the police stop his car and that, consequently, it would be
futile to make a controlled delivery. 6 1 Although Harris freely
implicated himself throughout his discussions with the DEA, "he
did not want his story to be recorded and he refused to sign a
54. See supra note 8 (discussing Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3)).
55. 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
56. Id. at 2433.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 2434.
61. Id.
[Vol 11188
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written" transcript of it.62 In addition, the DEA agent promised
that he would report any cooperation by Harris to the United
States Attorney, but promised Harris no reward for such
cooperation. 63
When called to testify at trial, Harris refused, despite both an
offer of immunity from the prosecution and a court order. 64 The
district court ruled that under Federal Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3), the DEA agent could relate what Harris had told him.
The court reasoned that Harris' statements clearly implicated
himself and were against his penal interest, Harris was
unavailable to testify, and corroborating circumstances ensured
the trustworthiness of his testimony. 65 The court admitted the
testimony and Williamson ultimately was convicted of various
drug crimes in violation of federal law. He appealed his
conviction on the grounds that the admission of Harris'
statements violated both Rule 804(b)(3) and the Sixth
Amendment's Confrontation Clause. 66 Although the Eleventh
Circuit affirmed the conviction without opinion, 67 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. 68
IV. MAJORITY OPINION
While the United States Supreme Court unanimously vacated
and remanded the case on the basis that the lower courts
improperly applied Rule 804(b)(3), the Justices disagreed on the
Rule's precise scope. 69 Writing for six members of the Court,
Justice O'Connor held that the Rule covers only statements
against penal interest that are disserving and excludes those
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. United States v. Williamson, 981 F.2d 1262 (1 1th Cir. 1992).
68. Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 681 (1994).
69. See infra notes 88-93 and accompanying text.
1994]
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which are neutral or self-serving. 70 She focused her opinion on
three main points.
Justice O'Connor first asserted that determining the scope of
Rule 804(b)(3) required discerning the meaning of "statement" as
used in the Rule's text. 7 1 She explained that defining "statement"
as "a report or narrative,"' 72 would sweep Harris' entire
confession within Rule 804(b)(3)'s exception to the hearsay rule"so long as in the aggregate the confession sufficiently inculpates
him." 73  Alternatively, defining "statement" as "a single
declaration or remark" 74 would confine the Rule to those
remarks within a confession that are "individually self-
inculpatory. "75
Despite the Rule's lack of textual guidance regarding these two
options, Justice O'Connor contended that the principles behind it
mandated a narrower meaning of "statement." ' 76 Rule 804(b)(3)
is premised on the assumption that "reasonable people, even
reasonable people who are not especially honest, tend not to
make self-inculpatory statements unless they believe them to be
true," 77 and this assumption is inapplicable to the broader
meaning of "statement." ' 78 The fact that a statement is self-
70. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2435-36. Justice O'Connor explained in her
majority opinion that the "district court may not just assume for purposes of
Rule 804(b)(3) that a statement is self inculpatory because it is part of a fuller
confession, and this is especially true when the statement implicates someone
else." Id. at 2435.
71. Id. at 2434. Justice O'Connor explained that pursuant to Federal Rule
of Evidence 801(a)(1) a statement is "an oral or written assertion." Id.
72. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2229 (3d ed. 1961)).
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
2229 (3d ed. 1961)).
75. Id. at 2434-35.
76. Id. at 2435. Justice O'Connor explained that one of the most effective
ways to lie is to mix falsehood with the truth, especially if that truth is against
the declarant's interest. For this reason, among others, Justice O'Connor felt a
narrower definition of what a statement is pursuant to 804(b)(3) was to be
implied from the Rule. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
190 [Vol 11
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inculpatory provides indicia of its truthfulness. However, simply
because "a statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory statement
says nothing at all about the collateral statement's reliability."79
Consequently, individual neutral or self-serving remarks within a
broad inculpatory statement merit exclusion as hearsay. 80
Second, Justice O'Connor rejected the government's contention
that the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 804(b)(3) supported
the admission of statements collateral to declarations against
penal interest.8 1 She observed the ambiguity of both the Rule and
its Advisory Committee's Note, as well as the division in the
academic commentary on this question. Nevertheless, she
declined to "lightly assume that the ambiguous language means
anything so inconsistent with the Rule's underlying theory." 82
Finally, Justice O'Connor asserted that the Court's ruling
would preserve the purpose of the hearsay exception for
statements against penal interest. 83 She emphasized that, under
Williamson, "confessions of arrested accomplices may be
admissible if they are truly self-inculpatory, rather than merely
attempts to shift blame or curry favor. " 84 Furthermore, she
stressed the necessity of viewing all statements against penal
interest within the context of their utterance, for even statements
which are facially neutral may potentially be against the
declarant's interest in light of the circumstances surrounding their
making. 85 Applying these principles, Justice O'Connor concluded
that the district court failed to make a searching, fact-intensive
inquiry as to whether each of Harris' statements truly was self-
79. Id.
80. Id. The majority of the Court stated "that collateral statements, even
ones that are neutral as to interest.., should Inoti be treated any differently
from other hearsay statements that are generally excluded." Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2436.
83. Id. Justice O'Connor denies that her interpretation of Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(3) would "eviscerate the against penal interest exception" or
make the exception "lack meaningful effect." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2436-37.
1994]
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inculpatory, and reversed and remanded the case. 86 Because of
this disposition, it was unnecessary to reach the Confrontation
Clause issue. 87
V. OTHER VIEWS
Six members of the Court agreed with Justice O'Connor's
standard. Nevertheless, Justice Scalia wrote separately to express
his view that the relevant inquiry in determining the admissibility
of any statement against interest "must always be whether the
particular remark at issue (and not the extended narrative) meets
the standard set forth in the Rule."' 88 In addition, Justice
Ginsburg wrote for three other members of the Court, both to
concur with Justice O'Connor's legal analysis and to disagree
with her application of the standard to the facts of the case. 89
Finally, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Thomas and Chief
Justice Rehnquist, wrote an extensive opinion accepting the
majority's result, but criticizing its analysis of Rule 804(b)(3). 90
Justice Kennedy argued for a broader meaning of the term"statement." The concurring opinion cited various commentators
and the Advisory Committee's Notes as supporting his
position. 91 Justice Kennedy advocated a standard which would
admit all statements related to precise declarations against penal
interest, subject to two limitations. First, courts should exclude a
collateral statement that "is so self-serving as to render it
86. Id. at 2437-38. The Court explained that the question to be answered
concerning Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3) is "whether the statement was
sufficiently against the declarant's penal interest, that a reasonable person in
the declarant's position would not have made the statement, unless believing it
to be true, and this question can only be answered in light of all the
surrounding circumstances." Id. at 2437. (citations omitted).
87. Id. at 2437.
88. Id. at 2438 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 2438-40 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg concluded
that since the declarant's self inculpatory statements were too intertwined with
his attempt to blame a codefendant, all of his statements should be considered
inadmissible. Id.
90. Id. at 2440.
91. Id. at 2441-42 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
[Vol 11
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unreliable."92 In addition, in cases involving a statement made
under circumstances in which the declarant has "a significant
motivation to obtain favorable treatment ... the entire statement
should be inadmissible." 93
CONCLUSION
Despite the disagreement among the Court's members
regarding the precise scope of Rule 804(b)(3), it is evident that
the majority of its members advocate a cautious, narrow
approach to hearsay testimony offered under its authority. This
approach comports with the view of the New York state courts,
as well as that of most federal courts of appeals. It reaffirms the
importance of ensuring that statements admitted through hearsay
exceptions to the rules of evidence are sufficiently reliable to
merit the trier of fact's attention. In addition, it promotes a
criminal defendant's right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses against him.
92. Id. at 2445 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 2445.
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